Principal-agent problems in implementation of ghana's health insurance scheme

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

principal-agent relationship exists between health service providers and their authority and clients. It asserts that health service providers as 'imperfect agents' of the authority and clients will take actions that aim to maximise profits at the expense of authority and clients (principal). The situation is possible when reimbursement is based on fee-for-service or a diagnosis-related groups. It looks at relationships between health service providers as agents and health insurance authority, and clients as principals in areas of provision of health services, supply of drugs, medicines and reimbursement. Results showed the private health service providers prescribed more drugs and medicines for clients towards profit maximisation (agency) than their public counterparts. Also, it was found that the public health service providers continued to provide health services and drugs despite health insurance authority indebtedness to them exhibiting more stewardship towards health insurance authority. It recommends strict regulations in tariffs/vetting claims and prompt reimbursement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)59-74
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Operations and Supply Chain Management
Volume11
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2018

Keywords

  • Health insurance clients
  • Health service providers
  • Pharmaceutical supply chain
  • Principal-agent
  • Tamale Metropolis

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Principal-agent problems in implementation of ghana's health insurance scheme'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this