Abstract
Epiphenomenalism has had a long historical tradition. It is the view that mental properties are causally inert with respect to the physical world. In this paper, I argue that this tradition faces enormous challenges and needs better arguments to defend its position, and to demonstrate this, I interrogate the (mostly contemporary) strands including computationalism, the idea of the illusion of conscious will, and causal exclusionism.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 481-501 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research |
Volume | 33 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Sep 2016 |
Keywords
- Automatism
- Consciousness
- Epiphenomenalism
- Mental causation
- Mind
- Physicalism