TY - JOUR
T1 - Executive Compensation, Ownership Structure and Loan Quality of Banks in Ghana
AU - Adjei-Mensah, Gifty
AU - Amidu, Mohammed
AU - Abor, Joshua Yindenaba
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 African Development Bank.
PY - 2015/9/1
Y1 - 2015/9/1
N2 - This paper analyses the effects of executive compensation and ownership structure on loan quality of banks. The study uses a panel data on 26 Ghanaian banks over the period, 2003-2011. Using a dynamic panel model, estimations are made using the Generalized Method of Moments. The results show that management is efficient when director shareholding is very prominent in banks. Institutional ownership and public listing of banks also have a significantly negative relationship with non-performing loans, while lag of non-performing loans, equity ratio, exchange rate depreciation and increases in net interest margins are seen to have a negative effect on loan quality. Executive compensation had no significant effect on loan monitoring.
AB - This paper analyses the effects of executive compensation and ownership structure on loan quality of banks. The study uses a panel data on 26 Ghanaian banks over the period, 2003-2011. Using a dynamic panel model, estimations are made using the Generalized Method of Moments. The results show that management is efficient when director shareholding is very prominent in banks. Institutional ownership and public listing of banks also have a significantly negative relationship with non-performing loans, while lag of non-performing loans, equity ratio, exchange rate depreciation and increases in net interest margins are seen to have a negative effect on loan quality. Executive compensation had no significant effect on loan monitoring.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84941750980&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/1467-8268.12151
DO - 10.1111/1467-8268.12151
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84941750980
SN - 1017-6772
VL - 27
SP - 331
EP - 341
JO - African Development Review
JF - African Development Review
IS - 3
ER -