Abstract
Conceptions of Africa's “development” have been predominantly generated by non-Africans since development emerged as a goal to be pursued in the mid-twentieth century. I maintain that these conceptions and the strategies for practicalizing them have failed, and defend the thesis that goals of development – however conceived – cannot succeed in implementation when conceived in isolation from the agency of their intended objects. I argue that failures of development goals in Africa stem from their inattention to insights into elements of Africa's history of social formation, which contain seminal ideas that should be indispensable to charting the course of the continent's development; and that such negligence hardly excusable given its effect on the lived experience of Africans. Were such inattention intentional disregard, but not fortuitous oversight, they may justifiably be considered immoral as well. As prescription for rectifying the difficulties occasioned by the failed earlier conceptions, I propose Gyekye's consequentialist moral theory, according to which the ultimate end of social formation is the common good, as a viable basis for a progressive conception of Africa's development (Gyekye 1997).
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Routledge Handbook of African Political Philosophy |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 285-303 |
Number of pages | 19 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781000893472 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780367561536 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2023 |