TY - JOUR
T1 - ‘Associations do not survive here’
T2 - Inequality, Mistrust and Obstacles to Collective Action in Oil Palm Growing Communities in Ghana
AU - Takyiakwaa, Dorothy
AU - Tetteh, Prince Selorm Kodzo
AU - Asante, Kofi Takyi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2024.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Collective action through farmer-based organisations (FBOs) could potentially improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers by opening up access to credit and inputs, overcoming market constraints, and reducing transaction costs. However, in the absence of strong or well-functioning farmer associations, the cost of market participation is likely to exacerbate economic hardships and inequalities among smallholders. Based on qualitative data from five oil palm growing communities in southwestern Ghana, we observe a general decline in associational life, driven by a breakdown of trust among farmers. The inability of poorer farmers to meet their collective obligations over time has weakened attempts at collective action and encouraged the emergence of highly individualised economic relations in the local agrarian economy. Under these circumstances, cooperation tends to be limited to small groups of better-off farmers who can afford the cost of cooperation. The result is a vicious cycle in which wealth disparities widen because the cost of participating in livelihood-enhancing collective schemes ends up excluding exactly those who need such schemes the most.
AB - Collective action through farmer-based organisations (FBOs) could potentially improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers by opening up access to credit and inputs, overcoming market constraints, and reducing transaction costs. However, in the absence of strong or well-functioning farmer associations, the cost of market participation is likely to exacerbate economic hardships and inequalities among smallholders. Based on qualitative data from five oil palm growing communities in southwestern Ghana, we observe a general decline in associational life, driven by a breakdown of trust among farmers. The inability of poorer farmers to meet their collective obligations over time has weakened attempts at collective action and encouraged the emergence of highly individualised economic relations in the local agrarian economy. Under these circumstances, cooperation tends to be limited to small groups of better-off farmers who can afford the cost of cooperation. The result is a vicious cycle in which wealth disparities widen because the cost of participating in livelihood-enhancing collective schemes ends up excluding exactly those who need such schemes the most.
KW - agrarian livelihoods
KW - collective action
KW - farmer-based organisations
KW - inequality
KW - Trust
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85183619831&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/00219096231224684
DO - 10.1177/00219096231224684
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85183619831
SN - 0021-9096
JO - Journal of Asian and African Studies
JF - Journal of Asian and African Studies
ER -